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Gender Standards v. Democratic Standards: 







Common wisdom, and development theory hold that gender standards and 
democratic standards go hand in hand, in the sense that countries that uphold high 
standards of gender equality are the same as countries that uphold high standards of 
democratic governance.   Even though this principle appears intuitively appealing, it is 
disproved by empirical measures I have collected on the recent history of the Maghreb 
(Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia).  In this paper, I report on my empirical experiments and 
submit tentative justifications for their outcome. 
 
Keywords:  Gender development, gender standards, democratic standards, gender 
politics, the Maghreb, North Africa. 
 
1.  An Intuitive Hypothesis 
As a female citizen of Tunisia, I have witnessed first hand the transformation of 
my country’s social fabric from an archaic society based on traditional patriarchal values 
to a modern, vibrant, society based on equal participation of men and women in the 
national struggle for development.  I credit this profound evolution to laws enacted in 
1957 shortly after Tunisia’s independence (1955) that replaced traditional gender roles by 
new, egalitarian legislation dealing with marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, 
etc.  These laws turned half of Tunisia’s population into active participants in the struggle 
for development, and helped bring it into the community of modern nations.  These 
transformations brought gender issues to the forefront of my personal and professional 
interests, up to and including my doctoral research.  In my doctoral research, I considered 
the correlation between gender standards and democratic standards, using North Africa as 
a case study. 
It is easy to imagine why one expects gender standards and democratic standards 
to be statistically correlated throughout the world.  The same progressive ideals that cause 
a nation to adopt standards of gender equality would cause it to create institutions that 
support good governance / accountability through representative democracy.  I have 
attempted to test this hypothesis by means of an empirical study, where I take measures 
on the three countries of the Maghreb, through their recent historical evolution. 
The three countries of the Maghreb represent a good sample for my study, both 
because of  what they have in common (contributing to the cohesiveness of the sample), 
and because of sets them apart (contributing to the richness of the sample).   
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• What They Have in Common.   The three countries of the Maghreb share a 
common ethnic background, a common history dating back to Phoenician times, a 
common religion, a common culture, and a common colonial past.  
• What Sets Them Apart.  What sets these countries apart is their post colonial 
nation-building experiences:  Tunisia has turned to a resolutely western model; 
Algeria has experienced a period of intense debate between two choices, an 
Islamic orientation and a Socialist orientation, and ended up switching (with some 
variation) from one to other; Morocco has followed a traditional model, adopting 
a constitutional monarchy and applying religious-inspired  laws. 
 
To quantify gender standards, I have used factors from the UN’s WISTAT database, 
complemented with other sources, mostly from the UNDP.  To quantify democratic 
standards, I have used the Freedom House factors.  Also, to reflect the historic evolution 
of these factors and to increase the size of my data sample, I have resolved to collect this 
date for four time periods, namely:  1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000.   The statistical analysis 
I have conducted on my data shows a total lack of correlation between gender standards 
and democratic standards. 
In order to make sense of this counter-intuitive outcome, I have resolved to 
analyze the following statistical relations: 
 
• The relation between gender standards and development standards. 
• The relation between gender standards and democratic standards for all the 
countries of the world. 
• The relation between gender standards and democratic standards for all the 
communities of which Maghreb countries are a part (Arab countries, Islamic 
countries, African countries, Mediterranean countries, Euro-Mediterranean 
countries). 
 
This paper reports on the results of the study and the lessons that can be drawn from it.  
In section 2, I briefly introduce the sample of my study, by characterizing the identity of 
the peoples of the Maghreb.  Then, in section 3, I discuss the data that I have collected 
and generated for the purpose of my study.  In section 4 I discuss the results of the 
statistical analysis of the data I have collected, and in section 5 I present some 
implications of my statistical analysis.  In section 6, I present preliminary conclusions 
and lessons learned. 
 
2.  History as Identity 
 
2.1. A Multi-Dimensional Identity 
Before I carry out my analytical and empirical study of the Maghreb, I must 
address the question:  who are the peoples of the Maghreb?  I submit the thesis that the 
identity of these peoples is defined by their history; to support my claim, I submit that all 
common characterizations of these peoples do not do them justice [Lacoste, 2004]. 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are all Arab countries, where Arabic is the 
constitutionally mandated official language.  Yet merely characterizing them as Arab 
countries does not do them justice because they are so radically different from other Arab 
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countries:  their Arabic identity is a cultural attribute, rather than a true ethnic attribute; 
their Arabic attributes have been watered down by subsequent Turkish/ Moorish/ 
Spanish/ Italian/ French influences; their Arabic identity appears to be a volatile political 
statement rather than a deeply felt sense of belonging.  Also, Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia are all Muslim countries, where Islam is the official religion.  Yet merely 
characterizing them as Muslim countries does not do them justice either, because they 
practice a  specific form of Islam that sets them apart from other Muslim countries:  
Unlike Shiites, they separate state and religion (at least in practice, if not in theory); and 
unlike Middle Eastern Sunnis, they practice a lightweight version of Islam, that is more 
focused on broad philosophical principles than on rigid ritual; also, unlike most Muslims, 
and perhaps due to greater European influence, North African Muslims have experienced 
a European-like religious emancipation that other Muslims have not. 
Also, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are all African countries, yet they are very 
different from other African countries, in terms of ethnic differences, religious 
differences, differences of culture, and differences of geography and history. Finally, 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are all Mediterranean countries, yet they are different from 
other Mediterranean countries in terms of their history, ethnicity, religion, political 
system, and economic standards.   
Who are the peoples of the Maghreb?  Are they Arabs? Muslims? Africans? 
Mediterraneans? Euro Mediterraneans? Phoenicans? Berbers? Moors?  Romans?  What 
makes them who they are? What makes them think the way they do?  I submit that the 
only way to define their identity is to consider their shared history, which will tell us who 
they are, how they think, where they come from, what are their aspirations, etc. 
 
2.2. A Common History 
Ethnically, the peoples of North Africa are referred to as Berbers.  While, for the 
sake of being sensitive, western languages (English, French, Spanish) go to great lengths 
to distinguish between the substantive Berber and the adjective that refers to uncivilized 
behavior (barbaric, etc), Arabs make no distinction between the two terms, as they have a 
single vowel (Hamza) for e and a.  The name Berber, which Arabs used to refer to North 
African peoples, is borrowed from Greek, where it means foreigner.  As such, it does not 
tell us much about the ethnic make-up of the peoples of the Maghreb.   
Because of its geography (in the middle of the Mediterranean, a short distance 
from Italy, at the cross roads of many sea and land trade routes), North Africa held great 
strategic significance for most of the civilizations that flourished in antiquity (Egypt,  
Rome, Greece, Mesopotamia, Phoenicia, etc).  As a result, The Maghreb has been the 
object of much covetousness throughout history, and has been the target of many 
invasions and migrations, with varying degrees of goodwill.  This rich history has left 
behind a rich genetic pool, as well as an openness and a greater acceptance of foreign 
influences. 
Among the civilizations of antiquity, Phoenicians and Romans left the greatest 
impact, with the former starting the city of Carthage in Tunisia, and the latter 
subsequently occupying much of North Africa, as they extended their influence 
throughout the Mediterranean and beyond.  The next major wave came from the East, 
when Arabs invaded North Africa to spread the message of Islam, and continued on their 
way to Spain.  Various Arab dynasties held sway over North Africa until the end of the 
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fifteenth century, when two concurrent events altered the course of North African history:  
the emergence of the Ottoman Empire in Constantinople as the  unifying Muslim power; 
the fall of Andalusia, and the migration of Muslims and Jews from Spain back to North 
Africa.  The influence of the Ottoman Empire started to decline in the nineteenth century, 
when France occupied in turn Algeria, Tunisia then Morocco.  As part of its colonial 
plans in North Africa, France modernized the infrastructure of these countries, created 
administrative structures to manage them, and brought colonial settlers who developed 
agriculture and industry. 
Independence movements in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco gained traction in the 
aftermath of the Second World War and eventually led to the independence of Tunisia 
and Morocco in the mid-fifties and the independence of Algeria in the early sixties.  The 
three countries then followed distinct evolutionary paths upon their independence, with 
Tunisia pursuing a western model of state organization, Algeria juggling two models (a 
Socialist model and a Muslim model) and Morocco adopting a traditional Islamic-
inspired model.  This has led to distinct configurations in terms of democratic standards, 
and in terms of gender standards. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
3.1  A Multi Method Approach 
My work started with a set of empirical observations: 
 
• Countries of the Maghreb have followed distinct political paths in their post-
colonial nation building experiments, leading to distinct outcomes. 
• The nation building experiences of these countries were concurrent with social 
transformations that had a great impact on gender. 
• There was no visible correlation between the evolution of political systems and 
the evolution of gender standards.  In some instances, women made gains on the 
coattails of political liberation movements; in other cases women rights were 
sacrificed for the sake of political expediency. 
 
As a result of these empirical observations, I resolved to conduct an experimental 
statistical study in which I record measures of gender standards and political standards 
for the three countries of the Maghreb at four different dates of their post colonial history, 
and investigate correlations or regressions between these standards.  When the statistical 
analysis failed to show any significant correlation between gender standards and 
democratic standards in the Maghreb, I resolved to take three steps: 
 
• First, I included the HDI (Human Development Index) into the mix and explored 
its correlation to the gender index (GDI) and the democracy index (DI).  The 
question I am attempting to answer is:  Why isn’t there a correlation between GDI 
and DI?  Is it because there is no correlation between GDI and HDI (which would 
be a social ill)?  Or because there is no correlation between HDI and DI (which 
would be a political ill)? 
• Second, I went back to the hypothesis of correlation between gender standards 
and democratic standards to check it again, statistically. 
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• Third, having confirmed that these two factors do have a meaningful correlation 
in general, I have analyzed this correlation for all the communities of which the 
Maghreb is a member, including:  Arab countries; African countries; Muslim 
countries; Mediterranean countries.  The question I am attempting to answer is:  
why does the Maghreb not abide by this worldwide correlation?  Is it because it is 
African? Arab? Muslim? Mediterranean? 
 
Once I have collected all these answers, I use analytical methods to search for an 
explanation of these observation in the history, culture, society, religion, and politics of 
these countries. 
 
3.2   Data on Gender Development 
Though I would like to think that we have some latitude in choosing  what 
variables to use to quantify gender equality, I am in fact severely limited by what data is 
available.  My first source of information is the United Nation’s WISTAT database, 
which records data on Women’s Indicators and Statistics, by country, and by year.  For 
many of its measures, WISTAT has data for years 1970, 1980, 1990 and the latest 
available year;  for others, WISTAT has data for 1970, 1980, 1990, 1995, and predictions 
for 2000, 2005, and 2010 (these measures were taken prior to 2000); for yet others, 
WISTAT gives values for 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995; for evolutionary variables, such as 
the rate of population growth, WISTAT has measures for two successive periods, 1970-
1975, then estimates for 2005-2010.  I have found that the most common time scale is 
1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and have resolved to adopt this as the calendar on which I 
collect data.  Given that I am considering three countries, this produces a set of twelve 
data points for each variable that is selected. 
Looking at the WISTAT database, I have selected eight variables of gender equality, 
on the basis of the following criteria: 
 
• They are meaningful in the context of the Maghreb, 
• They are relevant to this study, in the sense that they may have some impact on 
democratization. 
• WISTAT has data for them for all three countries of interest (Algeria, Morocco, 
Tunisia) and for all dates of interest (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000).   
 
These variables are: 
 
• Percentage of Female Illiteracy. 
• Percentage of Females enrolled in Primary Education. 
• Percentage of Females enrolled in Secondary Education. 
• Percentage of Economic Activity Traceable to Females. 
• Percentage of Economically Active Females. 
• Singulate Mean Age at Marriage for Females. 
• Female Fertility Rate. 
• Percentage of Females in National Legislatures. 
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Further to these variables, I have chosen to include the United Nations’ GDI variable 
(Gender-related Development Index).  Because this variable has only recently been used, 
I could not find values for it prior to 1990.  Hence I have resolved to compute it 
independently for prior years,  1970 and 1980; to this effect, I had to collect data on the 
following gender related variables: 
 
• Life Expectancy for Females. 
• Life Expectancy for Males. 
• Rate of Literacy for Females. 
• Rate of Literacy for Males. 
• Combined Enrollment in Primary and Secondary Education for Females.  
• Combined Enrollment in Primary and Secondary Education for Males. 
• Female Income Ratio. 
• Gross Domestic Product per Capita (in Dollars). 
 
The Male related variables and per Capita GDP are not part of the statistical study, but 
they are used in the calculation of the GDI.  It has taken a lot of effort to find data for 
these variables for the three countries of interest (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) and the four 
dates of interest (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000).  To this effect, I had to look up several 
references, including:  [Bollen, 2001]; [UNDP, 2005]; [Bleas, 2005]; [Globalis, 2005]; 
[HDR, 1998]; [HDR, 2006]; [IDEA, 2006]; [Kaidbey, 2003]; [Rubin, 2007]; [CEDAW, 
2004]; [Nabli, 2004]; [Ross, 2000]; [POGAR, 2005]; [UNSECO, 2005]; [Ourzik, 2005]. 
Table 1 below shows the evolution of the GDI by country; the computed values appear to 
provide a continuous evolution with the collected values. 
 
Country Year GDI 
Algeria 1970 0.421 
Algeria 1980 0.587 
Algeria 1990 0.627 
Algeria 2000 0.706 
Morocco 1970 0.387 
Morocco 1980 0.496 
Morocco 1990 0.511 
Morocco 2000 0.616 
Tunisia 1970 0.448 
Tunisia 1980 0.616 
Tunisia 1990 0.670 
Tunisia 2000 0.743 
Table 1.   GDI Values Sorted by Country, 1970-2000 
 
Because this data comes from so many different sources, it is not totally coherent:  
for examples, in the absence of data for a specific year (say, 1970) I use data from the 
closest year I find (1972).  Also, if I find data from 1975 and from 1985, I can infer 1980 
data by taking the average of the data values I find.  All the data values I have collected 
for gender equality is captured in Appendix A.  
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3.3   Data on Democratic Standards 
To reflect the level of democratization of each country at each year, I have 
tentatively selected the three main variables of Freedom House, which are:  PR (Political 
Rights), CL (Civil Liberties) and ST (Status).    Because status (ST) is derived from PR 
and CL (it takes its value according to the sum PR+CL), I do not record it as a separate 
measure. The results are given in the following table: 
 
Country Year PR CL 
Algeria 1970 6 6 
Morocco 1970 5 4 
Tunisia 1970 6 5 
Algeria 1980 6 6 
Morocco 1980 4 4 
Tunisia 1980 6 5 
Algeria 1990 4 4 
Morocco 1990 4 4 
Tunisia 1990 5 4 
Algeria 2000 6 5 
Morocco 2000 5 4 
Tunisia 2000 6 5 
Table 2.  Freedom House Scores, 1970-2000 
 
Note that the scores in this table are inverted, in the sense that the lower the score, the 
better.  If, for the sake of argument, we define a composite score that is the sum of the 
two existing scores, we find the table 3. 
 
Country Year PR+CL 
Algeria 1970 12 
Algeria 1980 12 
Algeria 1990 8 
Algeria 2000 11 
Morocco 1970 9 
Morocco 1980 8 
Morocco 1990 8 
Morocco 2000 9 
Tunisia 1970 11 
Tunisia 1980 11 
Tunisia 1990 9 
Tunisia 2000 11 
Table 3.  Composite Democracy Index, 1970-2000 
 
We can make two immediate observations:  the first is that while the GDI increases 
with time for each country, the composite democracy index does not.  The second 
observation is that the score PR+CL  is not commensurate with the gender equality 
indicators:  The democracy index ranks the countries in the following order:  Morocco, 
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then Tunisia, then Algeria.  By contrast, the gender equality indices consistently rank the 
countries in the following order:  Tunisia, then Algeria, then Morocco.    
 
4. Statistical Analysis 
 
4.1. Recoding Variables 
To simplify the subsequent analysis I recode all the gender variables so that they 
increase with gender standards and I recode all the democratic variables by taking their 
complement to 7, so that they increase with democratic standards. Furthermore, in order 
to reduce the number of variables under consideration, I start by computing correlations 
between variables of each category (gender, democracy), and select for each category 
representative variables, i.e. variables that have a high correlation with all the other 
variables of the same category.  This yields the following correlations matrix: 
Correlation matrix (Pearson): 
          
          































































































































































































































             
Importance 1 7 4 3 7 11 5 8 8 8 8 5 
             
Values in bold are significantly different from 0 with a significance 
level alpha=0.05      
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Summary statistics:       





































Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std.  
deviation 
school1 12 0 12 34.000 90.700 55.075 19.552 
school2 12 0 12 15.700 48.000 33.917 11.806 
ecoact 12 0 12 10.200 27.770 19.267 6.103 
ecofem 12 0 12 4.260 25.510 15.313 7.340 
marage 12 0 12 19.300 25.000 22.383 2.021 
fertrate 12 0 12 5.110 9.700 7.520 1.557 
parlmt 12 0 12 0.000 11.000 3.869 3.101 
gdi 12 0 12 0.387 0.743 0.569 0.115 
lifeexp 12 0 12 51.800 72.400 63.007 8.146 
literacy 12 0 12 9.800 60.100 30.388 16.744 
enrollment 12 0 12 28.200 76.000 53.371 15.006 
income 12 0 12 15.290 39.900 27.088 6.855 
        
Table 4.  Correlations, Representative Gender Variables 
 
In the row labeled importance, I record the number of variables that XLSTAT 
finds highly correlated with the current (column) variable.  Interestingly, this table shows 
that the single most representative variable is the fertility rate.  Other highly 
representative variables include the Life Expectancy, Enrollment Percentage, Literacy 
Rate, and (not surprisingly) GDI.  
For completeness, I also briefly review the correlation between variables of democratic 
standards, even though the identification of a representative variable is not important.  
Not surprisingly, PR and CL are very highly correlated.   
 
Variables PR CL 
PR 1 0.810 
CL 0.810 1 
   
Values in bold are significantly 
different from 0 with a 
significance level alpha = 0.05 
 
        
Summary statistics:       


























pr 12 0 12 1.000 3.000 1.750 0.866 
cl 12 0 12 1.000 3.000 2.333 0.778 
Table 5.  Correlations, Representative Democracy Variables 
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The high correlation between them suggests that political rights and civil liberties go 
hand in hand, for my sample.  I can use either as a representative factor for democratic 
standards;  I may in fact use their sum,  to which I refer as DI (democracy index). 
 
4.2  Cross Correlations 
In this section I review and analyze the correlations between variables of gender 
equality and variables of democratic standards.  Using the Pearson Correlation function 
of XLSTAT, I compute the correlations between these two sets of variables, and find the 
following table. 
 
Variables PR CL 
school1pc 0.185 0.116 
school2pc 0.111 0.254 
EcoAct 0.347 0.633 
EcoFem 0.386 0.618 
MarAge 0.081 0.287 
FertRate 0.154 0.326 
Parlmnt -0.614 -0.355 
GDI -0.164 0.023 
LifeExpect 0.187 0.332 
literacy -0.138 0.082 
Enrollment -0.450 -0.232 
Income 0.172 0.540 
   
Values in bold are significantly 
different from 0 with a 
significance level alpha = 0.05 
 
        
Summary statistics:       































Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std.  
deviation 
school1 12 0 12 34.000 90.700 55.075 19.552 
school2 12 0 12 15.700 48.000 33.917 11.806 
ecoact 12 0 12 10.200 27.770 19.267 6.103 
ecofem 12 0 12 4.260 25.510 15.313 7.340 
marage 12 0 12 19.300 25.000 22.383 2.021 
fertrate 12 0 12 5.110 9.700 7.520 1.557 
parlmt 12 0 12 0.000 11.000 3.869 3.101 
gdi 12 0 12 0.387 0.743 0.569 0.115 
lifeexp 12 0 12 51.800 72.400 63.007 8.146 
literacy 12 0 12 9.800 60.100 30.388 16.744 
enrollment 12 0 12 28.200 76.000 53.371 15.006 
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income 12 0 12 15.290 39.900 27.088 6.855 
Pr 12 0 12 1.000 3.000 1.750 0.866 
Cl 12 0 12 1.000 3.000 2.333 0.778 
Table 6.  Correlations, Gender versus Democracy 
 
The first column of this correlation table allows us to dismiss completely any 
notion that political rights have any meaningful correlation with gender equality.  Indeed, 
many of the entries in this column are negative, and most of those that are positive have 
small to negligible absolute values.  The only value that has a relatively high absolute 
value (Parlmnt vs PR) seems to be saying that the higher the percentage of women in 
national legislatures, the less political rights people have.  The second column (gender 
equality vs CL) is only marginally better, providing small or negative correlation values, 
except for two variables, EcoAct and EcoFem.  Yet, as table 5 shows, these two variables 
are very unimportant gender equality variables, as they are very poorly correlated with 
other gender variables. 
I had found, in table 11.4 that the most representative variable among the gender 
equality variables is FertRate, followed by GDI, LifeExpect, Literacy, and Enrollment.  
In table 7, I consider the correlations between these representative variables and the 
variables of democratic standards. 
 
Variables PR CL 
FertRate 0.154 0.326 
GDI -0.164 0.023 
LifeExpect 0.187 0.332 
literacy -0.138 0.082 
Enrollment -0.450 -0.232 
Table 7.  Correlations, Representative Gender Variables versus Democracy 
 
This table clearly shows that one has no basis for claiming that democratic 
standards raise with gender equality standards.  Not only are some of these variables 
negative (paradoxically), but even those that are positive have on average very small 
values, the largest being 0.332. 
 
4.3  Linear Regressions 
In the absence of conclusive results concerning correlations, I turn my attention to 
linear regression, and use DI (the value of expression 13-(PR+CL)) to represent 
democracy index.   I perform linear regression of DI with respect to gender factors, such 
as GDI, Female Fertility Rate,  Female Life Expectancy,  Female Literacy Rate,  and 
Female Enrollment Rate.  All these regressions yield inconclusive results, with very small 
R-square values (which represent the amount of variance of the dependent variable 
explained by the independent variable).  R-square values that I find in these regressions 
range between 0.001 (DI as a function of Female Literacy Rate) and 0.133 (DI as a 
function of Female Enrollment Rate). 
 
4.4   Human Development 
The absence of correlation between GDI and DI raises the question of how does 
the Human Development Factor (HDI) intervene in this situation:  If GDI is not 
 Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 11 #2 November 2009 111 
correlated with DI, is it because in Maghrebian societies Human Development (HDI) is 
not correlated with Gender Development (GDI), or is it because Human Development 
(HDI) is not correlated with democratic standards.  To resolve this question, I compute 
the correlations between GDI, HDI, and DI, over the sample of three countries and four 
date.  I find the following results:  
    
Variables GDI DI HDI 
GDI 1 -0.079 0.950 
DI -0.079 1 -0.090 
HDI 0.950 -0.090 1 
Table 8  Correlation Matrix for GDI, HDI and DI, for the Maghreb, 1970-2000 
 
It is clear from this matrix that GDI and HDI are highly correlated (0.950), hence 
it is unlikely that HDI gives a different outcome from GDI.  This analysis suggests that 
GDI and HDI are highly correlated to each other, and have little or no correlation to 
indices of democracy;  we represent this by the following figure.  In other words, if there 
is an analytical explanation to the lack of correlation between GDI and DI, it is unlikely 
to be a gendered explanation.  Instead, because GDI and HDI appear to be evolving in 
step, the explanation must be found in the fact that a people may have a high human 




5.1 GDI versus DI 
The failure of the correlation analysis and the regression analysis to yield a 
significant result regarding the statistical relation between GDI and DI leads me to revisit 
the question of whether there is any correlation between these two factors worldwide.  To 
this effect, I  collect data on HDI and GDI from the UNDP statistics database, and I use 
the democracy index of  The Economist.    This produces a table of HDI and GDI for the 
year 2005, and a table of DI for the year 2007, each containing about 170 entries (there is 
a two year gap between the year HDI and GDI are taken and the year DI is taken, but I 
will assume that these values do not change drastically over the two year period).  I put 
these tables side by side to eliminate any possible mismatch in the names of the countries 
or in their alphabetical orders.  The resulting table (which covers a total of 162 countries) 
is given in [Mili 2009].  Some countries have been eliminated when I did not have 
complete up to date information for them. 
I use  XLSTAT running on Microsoft Excel to compute the Pearson correlations 
between HDI, GDI and DI.  Because some values of GDI are missing, the correlations 
involving GDI will be run on the rows where values are available.  The correlations are 
given in the table below. 
 
Correlation matrix (Pearson):  
Variables HDI GDI DI 
HDI 1 0.999 0.645 
GDI 0.999 1 0.651 
DI 0.645 0.651 1 
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Table 9  Correlation Matrix for HDI, GDI, DI, all  162 countries 
 
This correlation matrix is very revealing. 
  
• First, it shows a very highly correlation between HDI and GDI, and puts into 
question why we need two variables. 
• Second, it shows a significant correlation between GDI and DI, meaning that the 
lack of correlation between these two variables in the Maghreb requires a specific 
explanation. 
 
5.2  Dimensions of Identity 
Because GDI and DI have a significant correlation worldwide but not for the 
Maghreb, I ask the question:  what aspect of the Maghreb’s identity accounts for this 








I consider correlations between GDI, HDI and DI for all four sets of countries, extracted 
from the list of countries used in the previous section. 
 
5.2.1  Islamic Countries 
As shown in the table below (obtained from winStat), the correlation between 
GDI and DI is 0.0292;  this is a very small value, suggesting these quantities are nearly 
independent. 
 
Pearson Correlation    
 HDI GDI DI 
HDI    
Correlation coefficient 1 0.998611346 
-
0.003809121 
valid cases 43 38 43 
one-sided significance 0 6.31131E-48 0.490329746 
    
GDI    
Correlation coefficient 0.998611346 1 
-
0.029216201 
valid cases 38 38 38 
one-sided significance 6.31131E-48 0 0.430884991 
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valid cases 43 38 43 
one-sided significance 0.490329746 0.430884991 0 
    
    
Cronbach’s Alpha 
-




0.029174862   
  
 
5.2.2  African Countries 
 The correlation between GDI and DI for African countries is very low at 0.0364, 
suggesting only the slightest statistical link. 
 
Pearson Correlation    
 HDI GDI DI 
HDI    
Correlation coefficient 1 0.998834442 0.019191069 
valid cases 47 46 47 
one-sided significance 0 7.21174E-60 0.449060144 
    
GDI    
Correlation coefficient 0.998834442 1 0.036468465 
valid cases 46 46 46 
one-sided significance 7.21174E-60 0 0.404927082 
    
DI    
Correlation coefficient 0.019191069 0.036468465 1 
valid cases 47 46 47 
one-sided significance 0.449060144 0.404927082 0 
    
    
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.063859735   
Scott’s Homogeneity-
Quotient 0.129578759   
 
 
5.2.3 Arab Countries 
The correlation between GDI and DI for Arab countries is -0.3038, which is fairly 







 Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 11 #2 November 2009 114 
Pearson Correlation    
 HDI GDI DI 
HDI    
Correlation coefficient 1 0.998106105 
-
0.296992581 
valid cases 18 16 18 
one-sided significance 0 1.16584E-18 0.115689674 
    
GDI    
Correlation coefficient 0.998106105 1 -0.30382703 
valid cases 16 16 16 
one-sided significance 1.16584E-18 0 0.12630569 
    
DI    
Correlation coefficient 
-
0.296992581 -0.30382703 1 
valid cases 18 16 18 
one-sided significance 0.115689674 0.12630569 0 
    
    
Cronbach’s Alpha 
-




0.673947627   
 
5.2.4 Mediterranean Countries 
The correlation between GDI and DI for Mediterranean countries (North Africa, 
the Middle East, Southern Europe) is very significant, at 0.7126. 
 
Pearson Correlation    
 HDI GDI DI 
HDI    
Correlation coefficient 1 0.999112741 0.700286932 
valid cases 18 16 18 
one-sided significance 0 5.78958E-21 0.000605573 
    
GDI    
Correlation coefficient 0.999112741 1 0.712588123 
valid cases 16 16 16 
one-sided significance 5.78958E-21 0 0.000974728 
    
DI    
Correlation coefficient 0.700286932 0.712588123 1 
valid cases 18 16 18 
one-sided significance 0.000605573 0.000974728 0 
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Cronbach’s Alpha 0.243136977   
Scott’s Homogeneity-
Quotient 1.007236775   
 
11.7.5. Conclusion and Assessment 
 We can easily dismiss the discussion of HDI and GDI, as they appear to be 
virtually identical, worldwide.   Hence I focus exclusively on the discussion of statistical 
relations between GDI and DI, which I summarize below: 
 
Country Set Sample Size 
Correlation  
GDI vs DI 
   
Maghreb 12 
(3 countries, 4 dates) 
-0.079 
   
Muslim countries 43 0.0038 
African countries 46 0.0364 
Arab countries 16 0.3038 
Mediterranean countries 16 0.7126 
   
Worldwide 162 0.645 
   
 
The value of the correlation between GDI and DI is closer to the values of Muslim 
countries and African countries than to the values of Arab countries and European 




6.1  Summary 
In this paper, I have explored the relation between gender equality and democratic 
standards, as it applies to countries of the Maghreb, namely Tunisia, Algeria, and 
Morocco.  To this effect I collected quantitative data on these two aspects then analyzed 
this data by means of correlations and regression, to find that in the Maghreb, these 
quantities are virtually independent.  In the absence of conclusive evidence supporting 
this correlation, I revisit this correlation for various sets of countries, including Arab 




Despite all their commonalities, Tunisian Algeria and Morocco have experienced 
different evolutions with respect to post-colonial gender policies. 
 
• Tunisia’s experience can be characterized as being Top Down.  I call it 
Liberalization by Decree, or perhaps to highlight its paradoxical nature, 
Revolution by Decree.    Women have achieved significant gains by virtue of the 
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laws enacted in Tunisia in the late fifties, yet had little input into the legislative 
process that produced these laws.  
• Algeria’s experience provides an example of conflict between democratization 
and gender equality.  As the forces of this conflict sway one way then another, 
Algeria moved from one orientation to another, creating unfavorable condition for 
long term advances in women’s rights. 
• In the case of Morocco, the policies of successive governments have been 
deliberately traditional, due to the power structure of the country.  The successive 
Kings (Mohamed V, Hassan II, Mohamed VI) owed their legitimacy to the 
acceptance of tribal leaders.  In exchange for their support, the King has to make 
concessions on issues that matter to them, including the status of women. 
  
This brief discussion shows how, each in its own way, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco 
have followed historical paths where gender equality and democratic standards were 
evolving in opposite or at least independent directions. 
 
6.3  Lessons Learned 
While the discussion above explains why, in the case of the Maghreb, gender 
equality and democratic standards are not correlated, it does not answer all my questions.  
In this section, I try to discuss what lessons this study teaches us about the correlation 
between gender equality and democratic standards. 
 
• Decisions made by the political elite matter the most.   Even though progress in 
gender equality has usually been driven bottom up, by demands from the base, the 
situation in Tunisia was determined exclusively by policy decisions taken at the 
top of the political hierarchy.  What has made it possible for Tunisia to achieve 
great advances in gender equality is the small scale of the country, and its social 
cohesion; this has made it possible for a central power in Tunis to control the 
whole country, and to effect concrete change.  I argue that a major difference 
between Tunisia and Morocco, for example, is the geographic and social 
cohesion.  While the power structure of Tunisia has been centralized, the power 
structure of Morocco has been decentralized, leading the King to govern by 
cutting deals with tribal chiefs, and thereby ceding part of his influence. 
• Affirmative Action as Model of Development.  I argued above that in Tunisia 
gender liberalization came in part at the expense of democratization, by creating a 
sense of loyalty and dependence in half the population.  I argue that this sense of 
indebtedness is temporary, but the effect of the gender policies is permanent.  The 
loyalty that this policy has engendered is bound to be temporary, as it vanishes 
with the passage of time, an increasing sense of entitlement, a change of 
generations, a change in political leadership, etc.  But the gains achieved by the 
policy are permanent, and in fact increase with time; if these gains make it 
possible for women to occupy positions of power and influence, then they can use 
these positions to further their gender related goals and make it easier for 
successive generations of women/ girls.  In other words, if on a first analysis 
women find that gender policies came at the cost of political autonomy they need 
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to remember that gender policies have long term benefits while political 
autonomy are short term burdens. 
• Human Development as a Substitute for Political Development.  My statistical 
analysis shows that the weakness of correlation between gender equality and 
democratic standards is not a gendered feature --- in the sense that what is weak in 
the case of the Maghreb is the correlation between human development (HDI) and 
democratic standards (Freedom House).  Indeed, because I find that gender 
equality (GDI) and human development (HDI) are highly correlated between 
them and poorly correlated to democratic standards, the issue is not that we can 
have high standards of gender equality but low democratic standards; rather the 
issue is that we can have high human development standards but low democratic 
standards.  My field observations support the following explanation:  whereas 
people used to get involved in politics as an intellectual/ political exercise (debate 
of ideas), nowadays (perhaps due to the collapse of communism and the Soviet 
Union, or to globalization) political activity centers primarily on economic 
grievances.  Hence as long as the economy is going well, people tend to stay away 
from politics, and even get uninterested in politics. What defines citizenship as the 
right to vote is moving away from politics to economics. Is it a direct effect of 
globalization? Is-it related to the emergence of a new citizenship? A displacement 
of the public sphere? An internationalization of the political question? Future 
investigations will probably be needed to answer theses questions. For now, we 
can observe that an increase in human development (HDI) due to economic 
advances is paralleled by a decline in democratic standards in the Maghreb. This 
is completely at odds with the traditional common wisdom, which provides that 
human development is linked to political freedoms. 
• GDI:  a Western Standard of Gender Equality.   The finding of my empirical 
study calls into question the premise that gender equality and democratic 
standards are correlated; I argue that it may also call into question how gender 
equality and democratic standards are measured.  Formal democracy has many 
shortcomings and democratization needs to be approached from structural 
prospects. The mere right to vote does not equate to democracy. An extension of 
this research may consist of exploring cultural dimensions of measures of gender 
equality and democratic standards. 
 
Among other findings of my research is the observation that GDI and HDI are so tightly 
correlated  (0.99911) that one is left to wonder why do we have two measures at all; 
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Table A. 1  Gender Equality Variables, 1970-2000 
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Country Year PR CL PR+CL 13-(PR+CL) 
Algeria 1970 6 6 12 1 
Algeria 1980 6 6 12 1 
Algeria 1990 4 4 8 5 
Algeria 2000 6 5 11 2 
Morocco 1970 5 4 9 4 
Morocco 1980 4 4 8 5 
Morocco 1990 4 4 8 5 
Morocco 2000 5 4 9 4 
Tunisia 1970 6 5 11 2 
Tunisia 1980 6 5 11 2 
Tunisia 1990 5 4 9 4 
Tunisia 2000 6 5 11 2 
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